Virtue in Several Dialogues

Plato presents Socrates bewitchs on the interview whether legality mountain be taught in several(prenominal) dialogues, most nonably in Protagoras and Meno. In Meno Menon puts the ch onlyenge to Socrates this way Can you severalise me, Socrates fecal matter rightfulness be taught? Or if non, does it occur by design? Or does it come neither by practice nor by t for each staring, simply do quite a lilliputian get it by nature, or in more or less other way? 35. Socrates claims to not distinguish the least little amour ab place moral excellence and unable to address as to its qualities.Moreover, he claims to receive no unmatched that does. 29. T here follows a intervention as to whether Gorgias, the Sophist, might not be such a person. Both Socrates and Menon know Gorgias teaching. Menon obviously has a higher creed of Gorgias teaching than does Socrates. It is agreed, upon Socrates designateion, that the intercourse should expire to explore what Menon, not Go rgias, knows round righteousness. And so Socrates, puts the question to Menon What do you say chastity is? 29Menon strikes secret code difficult in the question and attempts, forthwith, to resolve it. But there argon complications with the answer, for Menon has suggested that workforce, strivers, children, women exclusively demonstrate a different multifariousness of virtue, and concludes that there is a virtue for doing each phase of work associated with being a slave, a child, a woman, a empty man. Menons idea of virtue is what we would prefigure billet specific.Socrates attempts to show that Menons initial answer misses the storey because it does not show what is parkland to the virtues of these diverse actors. If the virtue of men and women, free men and slaves, does not sh argon something in commonalty past it cannot be said to be the same thing and genius would needfully c every the one virtue, and the other something else. As Socrates puts it, Even if there ar e galore(postnominal) different kinds of them virtues, they all have one something, the same in all, which suck ins them virtues. 30. Menon accepts Socrates criticism and manages that it is therefore one thing of which he speaks.In order to determine what the common property of virtue is, Socrates observes that Menon has associated virtue with the ability to vie reality affairs well. Socrates now sets out to question Menon on whether virtue would be present in the management of public affairs in the absence of mitigation and justice and Menon readily agrees that it would not.Socrates has already disclaimed whatsoever personal knowledge of virtue and he has steered Menon away from a discussion of Gorgias view of virtue. But when Menon fails to depart a glib-tongued account of his conception of virtue, Socrates poses a question with substantive content. Socrates may know zero point around virtue, but he knows plenty to ask whether virtue can be present without graveness a nd justice. The question suggest that it is Socrates rather than Menon who knows enough near virtue to keep the conversation going.Socrates interrupts the dialogue to make a brief statement about the conversation he has been having with Menon. He distinguishes the conversation he is having with Menon from those where the questioner is one of those smart fellow, who just chop logic and argue to win. Questions such as the one that Socrates and Menon are discussing whether virtue can be taught? are best left, says Socrates, to friends who wish to talk unneurotic. In such a relationship argues Socrates, I essential answer more mildly and more worry friends talk of the town together and perhaps it is more same(p) friends talking together, not only to answer with truth, but to use only what the one who is questioned admits that he knows. 34Socrates, in rapport with Menon, tries to clear up a mathematical confusion as to whether it is possible to seek that which is ruinous. Soc rates suggests, as he does in other dialogues, that we all passion approximate things. Menon has responded to Socrates question by verbal expression that one can desire bad things. Socrates tries to clarify this point by intercommunicate whether one desires that which is bad because of a mistake, that it is fancied to be bad.But Menon does not hook up on the point and contends that one desires the bad both as a result of a misplaced self-reliance as to its value and we can alike desire the bad even when it is cognise to be bad. But upon further questions, Menon agrees with Socrates that no one seeks to inflict injury and stroke upon himself, and it is injury and misery that are the results of that which is bad. Socrates unofficial of their agreement goes like this Then it is complain that those who desire bad things are those who dont know what they are, but they desire what they thought were good whereas they really are bad. . . . 37Menon has mentioned in pass(a) that virtue consists of the desire of good things and to provide the good. Menon admits that one good thing it is possible to desire is to possess gold and silvern and public honour and appointments. 38. Socrates inquires now whether the virtue of self-command of gold and silver must be qualified so that its possession is fair and just. Menon agrees that it is not a virtue to have such possessions if they have been unjustly acquired. On the contrary it would be a vice. It is necessary, Socrates says, to add to this getting, justice or temperance or piety or some other bit of virtue, or else it entrust not be virtue, although it provides good things. 39Socrates rebuffs Menon for exhausting to talk about virtue by looking at it piece by piece and drawing into the discussion a sense of virtue that he has not yet presented. Menon agrees that it is a problem and comments on his reaction to what has gone on advantageously now, my dear Socrates, you are just like what I always heard in the first place I met you always dumbfound yourself and enigmatic everybody else. And now you seem to me to be a regular wizard, you dose me with drugs and bewitch me with charms and spells, and overpower me in puzzledom. Ill tell you just what you are like, if you will forgive a little jest your looks and the rest of you are hardly like a flatfish and you sting like this stingrayonly go near and interrelate one of those fish and you go numb, and that is the sort of thing you seem to have through with(p) to me. 40Socrates response to Menons description of his puzzlement is that he himself is not clear-headed when he puzzles others, and that he is as puzzled as puzzled can be, and thence I make others puzzled too. 41. And where can the conversation go from here? Socrates says, that he wishes to investigate virtue with Menons abet so that we may both generate to find out what it is. 41Socrates argues that there is no such thing as teaching, only remembering. This notion of teach ing comes out of Socrates teaching in the immortality of the disposition. The soul dies but is born-again and thus never destroyed. (This is given by Socrates as a reason for why we must live our lives as lots as we can in holiness. . . .) Then, since the soul is immortal and often born, having seen what is on demesne and what is in the house of Hades, and everything, there is nil it has not watch outt so there is no wonder it can remember about virtue and other things, because it knew about these before. For since all nature is akin, and the soul has learnt everything, there is energy to hinder a man, remembering one thing onlywhich men call readingfrom himself finding out all else, if he is brave and does not wear down in seeking for seeking and learning is all remembrance. 42After questioning the slave boy about geometry Socrates seeks Menons concurrence in the proposition that the boy, shown to have been in break about geometry, is better off now, that he too is numbed but has knowledge about the limits of what he knows. By being numbed by the sting of Socrates conversation the slave has come a step onwards, as it seems, to find out how he stands. 29. Menon answers yes, when Socrates asked Then do you think he would have act to find out or to learn what he thought he knew, not knowing, until he tumbled into difficulty by thought he did not know, and longed to know? Menon agrees, that he does not think he would and thus gains from being numbed.Menon takes up again his captain question, whether virtue can be taught, or one gets it by nature or in some other way. Socrates agrees to proceed but contends that they need a common ground as neither of them can say at this point what virtue is. Socrates has Menon agree that if virtue is knowledge then it can be taught, and if not a knowledge then it cannot be taught. (Conclusion altogether that is taught call be called knowledge.)